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~~DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY FOURTH COUNTRIES~~
~~LIMITS AND CONSEQUENCES (JIR-100-9-58)~~

1. Although a large number of individual countries could, within the next decade, produce at least a few nominal-yield weapons and could adapt these weapons for delivery by aircraft, only France, Sweden, Canada, and perhaps West Germany could independently produce substantial stocks of nuclear weapons and ^{available} a missile delivery system ~~capable of reaching~~ ~~Blue targets.~~ ?

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a. France will probably attempt to test a nuclear weapon before the end of 1958 ^(or in early 1959) and, failing a substantial disarmament agreement, ~~or nuclear weapon assistance from the US or the UK~~ will probably proceed to develop and produce a family of fission weapons within the ten-year period. ^(De Gaulle is determined to join the ranks of the nuclear powers.) With a high-priority program, France could attain a limited operational capability with fission warheads for such weapons in 1963-64 and a substantial operational capability, including some thermonuclear-armed missiles by 1969.

b. West Germany will probably enter into independent development and production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems ^(particular if France or other 4th powers do) within the next five years, unless a common Western program for the production of nuclear weapons or a substantial disarmament agreement comes into being.

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c. Sweden will probably initiate limited nuclear weapons production as the necessary materials become available (about 1961).

Communist China [REDACTED] will probably seek to develop limited weapons production programs during the next 10 years; Japan is *less* likely to do so. 25X6

2. There will be strong pressures within Western Europe for a regional arrangement to produce and control nuclear weapons. The high cost of developing long-range missile systems and thermonuclear weapons would be a major incentive to this end. France, Italy, and West Germany (the FIG states) in a concerted effort could develop thermonuclear weapons by 1963 and could have a limited operational capability with thermonuclear-armed missiles in 1964-67.

3. Individual production of nuclear weapons by fourth countries *possibly* would be *restrained*, at least temporarily, by a US-USSR agreement provisionally banning or limiting nuclear tests. *(except France)* *most* Western European *Nato* countries would probably be deterred from individual production if the US agreed to provide nuclear weapons under some form of integrated NATO control or if the US and UK offered to provide technical assistance for common European production.

4. Fourth country production of nuclear weapons during the next decade is unlikely to alter basically the dominant nuclear positions of the US and the USSR or the dependence of Western European countries on the US. The Soviet Union will probably not regard a major European

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nuclear weapons program as increasing the likelihood of Western Europe initiating hostile action. Chinese Communists' acquisition of nuclear weapons would not in itself alter Peiping's basic international orientation and policies. However, individual fourth country nuclear capabilities would probably tend to increase the chances of general war by an expansion of local conflicts.

*End of
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